At 1:50 in the morning on May 24, 1944, Soundman Secondclass John Prock pressed his headphones tight against his ears and listened to the ocean 300 ft below USS England. The destroyer escort rolled gently in the darkness north of the Admiral T Islands. Proc had been tracking submarines for 6 hours straight. His back achd, his head throbbed. The coffee had gone cold 2 hours ago. Through the hydrophones, he heard something. A faint mechanical hum, propeller cavitation, the distinctive sound of a submarine trying to escape.
Row 116, the fourth Japanese submarine they had hunted in 5 days. Prock knew what would happen next. He had heard it three times already. The hedgehog mortars would fire. 24 projectiles would arc through the darkness and plunge into the Pacific. If they hit, there would be explosions, debris, oil, bodies. If they missed, the submarine would escape and the hunt would start over. But this time was different. This submarine was fighting back. The Japanese commander was executing maneuvers proc had never encountered.
Fishtailing, rapid depth changes, counterping to confuse the sonar. every tactic designed to break contact and vanish into the black water. Proc had to hold that contact. His ship, his crew, Lieutenant Williamson standing behind him on the bridge, all depended on the sounds coming through his headphones. What happened in the next 20 minutes would determine whether USS England continued her unprecedented killing streak or whether Row 116 became the submarine that got away. But nobody on USS England knew they were already making history.
Nobody knew that Japanese submarines were dying faster than they ever had before. Nobody knew that in 12 days this small, unimpressive destroyer escort would accomplish something no other ship in naval warfare had ever done. The problem was that American anti-ubmarine warfare was not working effectively enough. Japanese submarines threatened Allied operations throughout the Pacific. The Iclass submarines were large, capable boats, displacing 2,500 tons surfaced. They carried crews of over 100 men and could operate for 90 days without resupply.
Armed with six torpedo tubes and a 5-in deck gun, they were formidable weapons. The rowclass submarines were smaller but deadly effective in coastal waters. These boats displaced between 600 and 800 tons and carried crews of 40 to 60 men. They were designed for shorter range patrols and coastal defense operations. Both types operated throughout the Solomon Islands, New Guinea, and the Central Pacific. They intercepted convoys, reported Allied fleet movements, and delivered supplies to bypassed Japanese garrisons. Japanese submarine doctrine emphasized reconnaissance and fleet support rather than commerce raiding.
Submarines were expected to scout ahead of the combined fleet, report enemy positions, and attack capital ships when opportunities arose. This doctrine made Japanese submarines valuable strategic assets, but also made their loss particularly damaging to Japanese naval operations. American forces had tools to fight them. sonar could detect submarines underwater. The QC and QGB sonar systems used by American destroyers and destroyer escorts could detect submarines at ranges up to,500 yards under favorable conditions. Radar could spot them on the surface.
The SG surface search radar installed on most destroyer escorts could detect a surfaced submarine at ranges of 8 to 10 mi. Depth charges could destroy them. The Mark 9 depth charge carried 300 lb of TNT and could be set to detonate at depths ranging from 50 to 600 ft. But the tools were not enough. The fundamental problem was time. When a destroyer or destroyer escort detected a submarine with sonar, the vessel had to speed up and run directly over the submarine’s position to drop depth charges off the stern.
That created a blind spot. At close range, sonar could not maintain contact because the returning echo merged with the outgoing pulse. The physics of sonar detection meant that as the range closed below about 200 yd, the time between the transmitted pulse and the returning echo became too short for the equipment to distinguish, the submarine disappeared from sonar at exactly the moment when the attacking ship needed precise targeting information. This blind spot typically lasted 40 to 60 seconds, sometimes longer.
During that time, the submarine could change course, change depth, or change speed. A submarine running at 8 knots could travel 260 yd in 60 seconds. That meant the submarine could be anywhere within a circle 500 yd in diameter by the time the depth charges exploded. By the time the depth charges exploded, the submarine was somewhere else. The statistics proved it. In early 1942, American depth charge attacks achieved a kill rate of approximately 3%. That meant 97 out of every 100 attacks failed.
The submarines escaped. They survived to attack another convoy, report another fleet movement, deliver another load of supplies to Japanese troops. By 1944, the kill rate had improved to 20 to 30% through better tactics, improved depth charge patterns, and more experienced crews. But that still meant most attacks failed. American destroyer escort crews knew the problem intimately. Ships made multiple attacks on the same submarine, dropping dozens of depth charges with no result. The submarine would vanish, only to be detected again miles away or escape completely.
Individual attacks sometimes involved 30 or more depth charges dropped in carefully calculated patterns. Each attack disrupted sonar contact for 20 to 40 minutes while the water settled. During that time, the submarine could escape. Captains knew their weapons could not reliably hit what their sonar could not continuously track. The weapon that changed anti-ubmarine warfare was called the Hedgehog. It was developed by the British Royal Navy in 1941 and adopted by the United States Navy in 1942. The development came from British experience in the Battle of the Atlantic.
British Naval officers recognized that the blind spot problem was killing their effectiveness against German Ubot. The Royal Navy Directorate of Miscellaneous Weapons Development working with engineers from the Ministry of Supply began developing a forwardthrowing weapon in early 1941. The first prototype tests occurred in June 1941. Initial designs used a single large mortar, but testing showed that multiple smaller projectiles would be more effective. The final design used 24 spigot mortars arranged in four rows. The prostive name came from the appearance of the launcher.
24 spiggots arranged in rows that looked like the spines on a hedgehog’s back. Each spigot fired a single projectile, 7.2 in in diameter, 65 lb total weight, 35 lb of torpex explosive. Torpex was a British developed explosive compound consisting of 42% RDX, 40% TNT, and 18% powdered aluminum. It was approximately 50% more powerful than TNT alone. The projectiles fired forward, not backward like depth charges. They launched ahead of the attacking ship in an elliptical pattern. The MK 10 launcher, which was the type installed on USS England, had a range of 283 yds and created an elliptical pattern approximately 195 ft by 168 ft.
The Mark 11 launcher had a range of 267 yd. The projectiles entered the water nose first, sank at about 23 ft per second, and exploded only on contact with a solid object. The contact fuse required approximately 20 lb of pressure to detonate. If the projectiles missed the submarine, they did not explode. They just hit the ocean floor and went silent. That was revolutionary. Depth charges exploded whether they hit anything or not. The explosions created turbulence and noise that destroyed sonar contact for 30 minutes or more.
The pressure waves from the explosions created thermal layers in the water that disrupted sonar propagation. You could not tell if you had killed the submarine or just made a lot of noise. With Hedgehog, silence meant a miss. Explosions meant hits. If you heard detonations, you had hit the submarine. If you heard nothing, you had missed and could immediately reattack without waiting for the water to clear. The second advantage was the forward firing ark. The hedgehog fired ahead of the ship while the submarine was still in sonar contact.
The attacking ship could track the submarine continuously until the moment the projectiles entered the water. No blind spot, no guessing. The sonar operator could see exactly where the submarine was and adjust the aim accordingly. The ship maintained sonar contact throughout the attack run, tracking the submarine’s movements up to the moment of firing. This allowed the attacking ship to compensate for last second course changes or depth adjustments. The third advantage was lethality. A depth charge had to explode within about 25 ft of a submarine to cause fatal damage.
The pressure wave from a depth charge explosion could rupture hull plates, damage machinery, and flood compartments, but only if the charge exploded close enough. A hedgehog projectile had to physically hit the submarine to explode. When it hit, it exploded against the hull. 35 lb of torpex detonating against metal meant penetration. The explosive force was concentrated at the point of contact rather than dispersed through the water. One hit could rupture the pressure hull. Two or three hits guaranteed a kill.
The statistics proved it. In the Atlantic theater during 1943 and 1944, British ships using Hedgehog achieved a kill rate of approximately 18%. That was six times better than early war depth charges. By the end of the war, hedgehog equipped ships were responsible for over 50 confirmed yubot kills. American ships in the Pacific achieved similar results, but most destroyer escorts did not have hedgehog yet. The weapon was new. Production was limited. Only the newest ships got them during construction.
As of May 1944, fewer than 50 American destroyer escorts in the Pacific carried hedgehog launchers. USS England was one of the lucky ones. She was a Buckley class destroyer escort. Hull number DE635. Commissioned on December 10th, 1943 at the Bethlehem Steel Shipyard in San Francisco. She displaced 1,400 tons light, 1740 tons full load, length 306 ft, beam 37 ft. Draft varied from 9 ft 5 in light to 13 ft 6 in full load. Powered by two steam turbines, generating 12,000 shaft horsepower through electric drive.
The turbo electric drive system was unusual for ships of this size, but provided excellent maneuverability and precise speed control. These characteristics proved valuable during anti-ubmarine operations where precise positioning was critical. Top speed 24 knots, range 6,000 nautical miles at 12 knots. Crew complement 186 men. Armament was modest compared to fleet destroyers. Three 3-in 50 caliber dual-purpose guns in open mounts, one forward, two aft, eight to nine 20 mm anti-aircraft guns, three 21-in torpedo tubes. But the real weapons were the anti-ubmarine systems.
One hedgehog launcher forward with 144 projectiles. 8K gun depth charge projectors. Two stern racks for rolling depth charges. Total load 200 depth charges. QHB sonar system for underwater detection. SG surface search radar. The ship was named after Enen John Charles England. He was born in Harris, Missouri on December 11th, 1920. He studied drama at Pasadena City College from 1938 to 1940. He enlisted in the United States Navy on September 6th, 1940. He completed training on USS New York from November to December 1940, then attended Naval Reserve Midshipman’s School.
He was commissioned as an enen on June 6th, 1941 and assigned to USS Oklahoma. On the morning of December 7th, 1941, Oklahoma was morowed at Ford Island Pearl Harbor. At 0755, Japanese aircraft attacked. Multiple torpedoes hit Oklahoma’s port side. The battleship rolled over and capsized in 12 minutes. 429 men died. Enson England was working in the radio room when the ship capsized. He was trapped below decks and never made it out. His body was recovered after the war when Oklahoma was salvaged.
He was 20 years old. The Navy named DE635 in his honor. The commissioning ceremony on December 10th, 1943 included England’s mother, Mrs. HB England, as the ship’s sponsor. Lieutenant Commander Walton Barkley Pendleton took command. Pendleton was a career Navy officer, 46 years old, born November 24th, 1897. He had served on destroyers during World War I and spent the interwar years in various assignments, including naval war college and staff positions. He was methodical, experienced, and careful. He understood destroyer operations and anti-ubmarine warfare doctrine.
He was also smart enough to recognize that his executive officer was better at anti-ubmarine warfare than he was. Lieutenant John Albert Williamson was the executive officer from Brighton, Alabama. He had extensive experience with anti-ubmarine warfare and sonar operations. Williamson was obsessed with anti-ubmarine warfare. He understood sonar physics. He understood submarine tactics. He understood how to train a crew. He had studied every available report on successful anti-ubmarine attacks in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. He knew what worked and what did not.
Pendleton recognized this and gave Williamson unusual freedom. During attacks, Williamson conned the ship while Pendleton supervised from the bridge. The arrangement worked because both men understood their roles and trusted each other completely. From December 1943 through March 1944, USS England conducted shakedown training off the California coast. Williamson drilled the crew relentlessly. Hedgehog attacks, sonar searches, night operations, emergency maneuvers over and over. He ran the crew through every scenario he could imagine. surface contacts at night, submerged contacts in rough seas, multiple contacts requiring rapid target switching, equipment casualties requiring backup procedures.
The crew complained, “The training was exhausting. Watch schedules were brutal. Sleep was limited. Every mistake resulted in additional drills.” Williamson did not care. He told them submarines were smart and submarines were deadly and the only way to survive was to be better trained than the enemy was skilled. The sonar crew trained the hardest. Soundman Secondass John Proc and Soundman Third Class Roger Burnernhard became highly proficient operators. Both men trained for hours each day on sonar detection. Williamson set up training scenarios.
Friendly submarines would play enemy. The England would hunt them. The submarines used every evasive tactic in their playbook. Sharp turns, rapid depth changes, knuckles created by reversing propellers to confuse the sonar, return, speed changes to break contact, proc and Burnhard learned to identify subtle sounds, propeller cavitation, hull popping under pressure, ballast tank flooding. They learned to distinguish echoes from actual contacts. They learned to track fastmoving submarines through radical maneuvers. They learned to compensate for water conditions that affected sonar propagation, temperature layers, salinity gradients, underwater currents.
By March 1944, they were among the best sonar operators in the Pacific Fleet. On March 12th, 1944, USS England arrived at Espiritu Santo in the new Hebdes. She joined escort division 40 under commander Hamilton Haynes. Her primary mission was convoy escort. The work was tedious. Escort a convoy from Espiritu Santo to Guadal Canal. Turn around. Escort another convoy back. Repeat. No combat. No submarines. Just endless steaming back and forth across the same routes. The crews of the merchant ships in the convoys appreciated the protection, but for England’s crew, the work felt anticlimactic after all their training.
They had trained for intense anti-ubmarine combat. Instead, they were shephering cargo ships across waters that had been relatively secure for months. The crew grew frustrated. All that training seemed wasted. Then, on May 18th, 1944, everything changed. Fleet Radio Unit Pacific intercepted and decoded a Japanese message. Submarine 116 was delivering supplies to Japanese troops at Buin on the southern tip of Bugenville. The message included the submarine’s course, speed, and schedule. American intelligence knew exactly where I-16 would be.
Fleet radio unit Pacific based at Pearl Harbor was responsible for intercepting and decoding Japanese naval communications. American cryp analysts had broken the Japanese naval code designated JN25. This code was used for operational messages between Japanese naval units. The intelligence derived from JN25 intercepts gave American forces enormous advantages throughout the Pacific War. Commander Haynes received orders to intercept. USS England, USS George and USS Rabby departed Pervvis Bay on the afternoon of May 18th. The three destroyer escorts formed a line of breast with 16,000 yards between ships.
This formation created a sonar search area approximately 9 mi wide. They steamed northwest toward the intercept point. Each ship ran at 15 knots with active sonar sweeping continuously. On the morning of May 19th, 1944, an American patrol aircraft spotted I-16 on the surface and radioed a contact report. The three destroyer escorts increased speed and headed for the reported position. At 1:35 in the afternoon, England’s sonar operator picked up a contact. Clear signature submarine range 2,000 yd bearing 085°.
Lieutenant Williamson took the con. He ordered engine room to reduce speed to 12 knots for precise maneuvering. The sonar team tracked the submarine’s movements. I-16 was running submerged at about 8 knots, depth 150 ft. The submarine was trying to reach Buganville on schedule and apparently had not detected the approaching destroyer escorts. Williamson maneuvered England into attack position. The ship approached the submarine from a stern, maintaining sonar contact throughout the approach. He kept the ship’s speed matched to the submarines to maintain stable sonar conditions.
At 1,000 yd, Williamson ordered the hedgehog crew to prepare for attack. The crew loaded the spiggots and checked the firing circuits. At 500 yd, he ordered, “Stand by.” The submarine continued on course, unaware. At 300 yd, Williamson ordered, “Fire!” The hedgehog launcher erupted. 24 projectiles arked through the afternoon air and plunged into the Pacific ahead of England. The pattern entered the water in an ellipse 200 yd ahead of the ship. The sonar operator maintained contact. The submarine was still there, still on course.
10 seconds passed. 15 20 nothing miss. The projectiles had landed in a pattern around the submarine, but none had hit. I6 continued on course for another 5 seconds. Then the submarine turned hard to port. The commander had heard the splashes and realized he was under attack. Williamson ordered England to follow the turn. The sonar crew held contact. The submarine was now maneuvering evasively, trying to break contact. The Japanese commander was skilled. He knew American sonar capabilities and was using every technique available to exploit their weaknesses.
For the next hour, USS England chased I-16 through a series of maneuvers. The submarine would turn. England would follow. The submarine would change depth. The sonar would compensate. The submarine commander varied his tactics, never establishing a mot predictable pattern. Turn intervals changed. Depth changes were irregular. Speed adjustments kept Williamson guessing. Williamson made four more hedgehog attacks. All missed. The submarine commander was skilled. He timed his turns to coincide with England’s firing runs, throwing off the aim. Each time England reached firing position, the submarine would execute a hard turn or rapid depth change that moved it outside the hedgehog pattern before the projectiles reached target depth.
On the fifth attack run, Williamson decided to wait. Instead of firing as soon as England reached firing position, he tracked the submarine for an extra 30 seconds. He watched the pattern. The submarine was turning right every time England approached. The Japanese commander had fallen into a pattern without realizing it. Under stress, facing repeated attacks, he had defaulted to a preferred defensive maneuver. Right turns. Always right turns. Williamson accounted for that. When England reached firing in position, Williamson aimed the hedgehog pattern 30° to the right of the submarine’s current course.
Then he fired. The projectiles splashed down. The sonar operator reported the submarine turning right exactly as predicted. 3 seconds later, explosions. Four to six distinct detonations. Then a massive underwater explosion. The hedgehog hits had ruptured I16’s pressure hull. Seawater flooded in under enormous pressure. At 150 ft depth, the water pressure was 65 lb per square in. Through the hull breaches, water entered at tremendous velocity. The submarine’s structural frames collapsed. The hull imploded. I-16 went down at 235 in the afternoon with all 107 men aboard.
Lieutenant Commander Takuchi Yoshitaka, the boat’s commanding officer, died with his crew. Debris began surfacing 20 minutes later. Wood fragments, cork, oil. A 75lb bag of rice, still sealed in waterproof wrapping, personal items, pieces of equipment. The debris field spread as currents carried the lighter materials away from the sink point. The three destroyer escorts circled the debris field through the night. By dawn on May 20th, the oil slick stretched 6 mi long and 3 mi wide. The kill was confirmed.
USS England had sunk her first submarine on May 19th, 1944. The crew celebrated briefly. Then they received new orders. American intelligence had intercepted another Japanese message. Seven submarines from submarine squadron 7 were forming a picket line north of the Admiral T islands. The line was designated scouting line NA. Its purpose was to detect American fleet movements toward the Palao Islands. The Japanese high command expected an American offensive in the central Pacific. The submarine picket line was intended to provide early warning of American carrier task force movements.
Each submarine was assigned a specific patrol area along a line running roughly east to west. They were to remain on station, report any American ship movements, and attack targets of opportunity. The submarines were row 104, row 105, row 106, row 108, row 109, row 1112, and row 116. All were row 100class submarines smaller than the iclass coastal defense boats displacing 611 tons surfaced 795 tons submerged. Length 199 ft 10 in. Crew varied between 49 and 58 men depending on configuration.
Armed with four 21-in torpedo tubes and one 3-in deck gun. Maximum diving depth 246 ft. Maximum surface speed 14 knots. Submerged speed 8 knots. Range 3,500 nautical miles at 12 knots surfaced. Not particularly fast or capable compared to larger Japanese submarines, but adequate for reconnaissance work. American intelligence knew exactly where each submarine was supposed to be. The Japanese had transmitted the positions in code. American cryp analysts had broken the code and plotted every submarine on a map.
It was a perfect setup for a hunt. USS England, USS George, and USS Rabi steamed north toward scouting line NA. At 0350 on the morning of May 22, 1944, USS George detected a radar contact, range 14,000 yd, bearing 303°. The contact was on the surface. a submarine running on diesels to recharge batteries. Japanese submarines typically surfaced at night to run their diesel engines and recharge the batteries used for submerged operations. This made them vulnerable to radar detection, but was operationally necessary.
Submerged operations drained batteries that could only be recharged by running diesel engines on the surface. The three destroyer escorts increased speed to 20 knots and closed the range. USS George illuminated the contact with search lights at 4,000 yds. The submarine was row 106 commanded by Lieutenant Uda Kitai. Uda saw the search lights and realized he had been caught on the surface. He ordered a crash dive. Row 106’s bow went down. Water flooded the forward ballast tanks. The submarine dove at a steep angle trying to reach safe depth before the American ships could attack.
The crew worked frantically to close hatches and secure equipment. A crash dive was a desperate maneuver that could cause equipment damage and put enormous stress on the hull, but it was the only option when caught on the surface by enemy warships. USS George fired a hedgehog salvo at 0415. The projectiles missed. Row 106 continued diving and began evasive maneuvers. At 0425, USS England gained sonar contact. Williamson took the con and maneuvered into attack position. Row 106 was now at 275 ft near her maximum safe depth.
She was turning hard, trying to break sonar contact. At this depth, the submarine was operating at the edge of her structural limits. The pressure hull was under enormous stress. Any additional damage could be catastrophic. Williamson tracked the turns. First hedgehog attack at 0433. Miss, Williamson repositioned. He analyzed the submarine’s maneuver pattern. The Japanese commander was alternating between hard right and hard left turns every 40 seconds. Predictable once you saw the pattern at 0501, Williamson fired the second hedgehog salvo.
This time he aimed ahead of the submarine’s turn. The projectiles splashed down. 3 seconds later, three explosions in rapid succession, then a massive underwater detonation. Row 106’s pressure hull ruptured at 275 ft. The submarine imploded. All 49 men died instantly. At that depth, the hull collapse was catastrophic and immediate. At dawn, the destroyer escorts found debris and a large oil slick. two submarines in three days, but scouting line NA still had five more submarines. On May 23, 1944, an Allied patrol aircraft spotted row 104 on the surface 250 nautical miles northn northwest of Caviang.
The aircraft radioed the position to the destroyer escorts. By sunset, the three ships had closed within radar range. At 0604 on the morning of May 23, USS Ra detected row 104 on radar, range four nautical miles. The submarine was on the surface running on diesels. The three destroyer escorts charged in at full speed. Row 104 detected them at 2 mi and crash dived. USS Rabi and USS George arrived first. Both ships made hedgehog attacks over the next two hours, eight attacks total.
all missed. The submarine commander, Lieutenant Izzubuchi Hisashi, was skilled and aggressive. He executed radical depth changes and course reversals that threw off the the American aim. Izubuchi had commanded row 104 for 9 months and had extensive combat experience. He knew how to fight. At 0834, USS England arrived and took over the attack. Williamson analyzed the submarine’s pattern. Izubuchi was varying his maneuvers randomly. No pattern. That meant Williamson had to force him into a pattern. Williamson positioned England ahead of the submarine’s current course.
Then he waited. Sonar tracked row 104 approaching. 2,000 y 1500 1,000. Izubuchi apparently thought he had evaded the Americans and was proceeding on base course toward his assigned patrol station. At 500 yd, Williamson fired. The Hedgehog Salvo landed directly in row 104’s path. The submarine ran straight into the pattern. 10 to 12 explosions. The submarine’s hull ruptured in multiple locations. The forward torpedo room flooded. The control room flooded. The engine room flooded. The submarine sank bow first.
Row 104 sank immediately. All 58 crew members died. Debris surfaced at 10:45. Another oil slick. Three submarines in 4 days. USS England was becoming famous. Word spread through the Pacific Fleet. Ships started calling her the submarine killer. Radio messages between ships mentioned England’s success. Other destroyer escort crews wanted to know what England was doing differently. The crews confidence soared. They felt invincible. By the third kill, the crew believed they could sink anything, any submarine, anywhere, anytime. The combination of Williamson’s tactical skill, the sonar crews proficiency, and the hedgehog’s effectiveness seemed unbeatable.
The Japanese noticed. On May 23, 1944, the commander of submarine squadron 7, Captain Kato Rionoske, sent an urgent message to all submarines on scouting line NA. Enemy anti-ubmarine forces operating in your area. Multiple submarines lost. All boats. Execute relocation 30 mi westward immediately. The message revealed the severity of the situation. Three submarines had been lost in rapid succession. The picket line had been compromised. Kato was attempting to preserve his remaining submarines by relocating them outside the area where the American ships were operating.
American intelligence intercepted and decoded the message within hours. The new positions were plotted. The hunt continued. At 0120 on the morning of May 24, 1944, USS George detected row 116 on radar. Range 10,000 yd. The submarine was on the surface. The three destroyer escorts closed in. Row 116 crash dived at 4,000 yd. But this time, the submarine commander knew what was coming. He knew three submarines had already been sunk. He knew the Americans had a deadly forward firing weapon.
The radio messages from submarine squadron 7 headquarters had made that clear. Lieutenant Okab Teeshi commanded row 116. He had nine previous war patrols. He understood submarine operations and American anti-ubmarine tactics. He decided to fight back rather than simply evade. At 0150, USS England gained sonar contact. Williamson took the con and maneuvered for attack. Row 116 immediately began aggressive evasive maneuvers, not the standard turns and depth changes. Okab was fishtailing, kicking the rudder back and forth to create erratic movement.
He was also counterping, transmitting his own sonar pulses to confuse the American sonar operators. The counterping created multiple false echoes that cluttered the sonar display. John Prock sat at the sonar station and tried to maintain contact. The submarine’s signature kept breaking up. The counterping created false echoes. The fishtailing made the contact appear to jump around. Prock had to filter through all of that to find the real submarine. He adjusted the sonar gain. He changed the donor pulse rate.
He used every technique Williamson had taught him during training. Williamson made the first attack run at 0205. Miss Okab reversed course and dove deeper. Second attack run at 0210. Miss Okab changed depth rapidly, confusing the firing solution. Third attack run at 0214. Williamson aimed carefully, tracked the submarine’s movements, compensated for the evasive maneuvers. Fire. The hedgehog projectiles arked out and splashed down. Three to five explosions, not as many as the previous kills. The sonar operators heard breaking up noises, metal tearing, compartments flooding, but no massive explosion.
Row 116 was severely damaged, but still intact. She was sinking slowly, flooding from multiple compartments. The crew tried to surface, but the damage was too extensive. The bow planes were jammed. The ballast tanks would not blow. Water continued to flood into damaged compartments. At 0702, debris began appearing on the surface. Small amounts of oil. By the next day, the oil slick had expanded to cover several square miles. Row 116 went down with all 56 men aboard. Four submarines in 5 days.
On May 26th, the three destroyer escorts headed to Manis Island to refuel and rearm. The hedgehog magazine was nearly empty. The depth charge racks were half depleted. The crew was exhausted. They had been at sea continuously for 8 days with minimal sleep and constant tension. On the way to Manis at 23 03 hours on May 26, USS Rabby detected another radar contact. Submarine on the surface row 108. The crew of USS England groaned. They were tired, low on ammunition, and heading to port, but orders were orders.
The three destroyer escorts turned toward the contact. Row 108 detected them and submerged. USS Rabby lost contact. USS George searched but found nothing. At 2315, USS England gained sonar contact. Lieutenant Williamson took the con for what he thought would be their final attack before resupply. The crew was exhausted, but row 108 was right there, confirmed on sonar. Williamson maneuvered into attack position. One attack run. That was all the hedgehogs they had left. 12 projectiles, half a salvo.
If they missed, they would have to chase the submarine with depth charges. At 23 23 hours, Williamson ordered fire. 12 hedgehog projectiles splashed down. Silence for 2 seconds. Then multiple explosions from 250 ft down. Row 108’s hull ruptured. The submarine went down with all 53 men, five submarines in 8 days. USS England arrived at Manis on May 27 and began taking on supplies. The crew rested for the first time in over a week. The Hedgehog magazine was refilled to capacity.
Fresh depth charges were loaded. Fuel tanks topped off. Provisions restocked. Minor mechanical issues were repaired. The sonar equipment was recalibrated. By May 30th, the ship was ready to return to patrol. But by then other American ships had heard about England’s success. A hunter killer group built around the escort carrier Hoget Bay arrived on station. Destroyers Hazelwood, Herman, Hell, and McCord spread out across the search area. They wanted the remaining submarines. The opportunity to hunt Japanese submarines with precise intelligence on their locations was too valuable to pass up.
Multiple ships converged on the area where scouting line NA was operating. On the morning of May 31st, USS Hazelwood detected row 105 on radar. Captain Kato Rionoske, commander of submarine division 51, was embarked aboard the submarine. The submarine’s commanding officer was Lieutenant Inu Junichi. Kato was experienced. He had commanded submarine divisions throughout the Pacific War. his squadron had been systematically destroyed over the past two weeks. He knew the term Americans were hunting him. He also knew that as the senior officer present, his survival was important for maintaining the operational capability of the submarine force.
For 24 hours, multiple American ships pursued Row 105. Hazlewood attacked, Miss Herman attacked, Miss McCord attacked. Miss the submarine evaded every attack through skilled maneuvering and luck. Kato and Enuaya worked together with Kato providing strategic guidance and Eno handling the tactical maneuvering. They used every trick available. They hid in thermal layers that disrupted sonar. They maneuvered into positions where attacking ships risked hitting each other. They changed depth rapidly to break contact. The American ships were frustrated. They had a submarine trapped in a limited area but could not kill it.
At dawn on May 31st, USS England arrived in the area. The other ships had formed a barrier around row 105. The submarine was trying to slip between USS Rabi and USS George, but could not find a gap. Commander Haynes, the division commander, radioed USS England with a message that became famous. Oh hell, go ahead, England. Williamson took the con. The sonar crew picked up row 105 immediately. The submarine was directly between two American ships. Trying to stay in a blind spot where neither could fire without risking the other.
Williamson maneuvered England into a position where she could fire safely. He brought the ship around to an angle where the hedgehog pattern would not endanger the other American vessels. At 0729, he fired the hedgehog salvo. six to 10 detonations. Then at 0741, a massive underwater explosion. Row 105 went down with all 55 men, including Captain Kato. Six submarines in 12 days. No ship in naval history had ever accomplished anything comparable. The crew of USS England were exhausted, proud, and somewhat stunned.
They had trained hard and fought well, but six kills in 12 days exceeded anything they had imagined. The statistical improbability of the achievement was staggering. Individual submarine kills were rare enough. Six in rapid succession was unprecedented. On June 1st, 1944, USS England returned to Manis for extended rest and refit. The crew received word that they had been awarded the presidential unit citation, one of only three destroyer escorts in World War II to receive that honor. The citation recognized exceptional performance under combat conditions.
Lieutenant Commander Pendleton was awarded the Navy Cross. Lieutenant Williamson received the Silver Star. Multiple crew members received individual commendations, including bronze stars and letters of commendation. Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, sent a message to USS England that became famous throughout the Navy. There will always be an England in the United States Navy. That promise was kept. When the first England was Mortis T2, decommissioned in 1945, the Navy assigned the name to a guided missile cruiser, DLG22, commissioned on December 7th, 1963.
The second USS England served with distinction during the Cold War, participating in operations in the Pacific and serving as a test platform for advanced anti-ubmarine warfare systems. The Japanese response to the destruction of scouting line NA was immediate and severe. Japanese submarine operations in the central Pacific effectively ceased for 3 months. The loss of six submarines in 12 days, including an entire reconnaissance line and the division commander, convinced Japanese naval headquarters that American anti-ubmarine capabilities had dramatically improved.
They did not understand what had changed, but the results were undeniable. Japanese submarine commanders who had previously operated aggressively became cautious. They spent more time submerged, ran at slower speeds, avoided areas where they might encounter American destroyer escorts. This caution reduced their effectiveness as reconnaissance platforms. Submarines that remained submerged could not cover as much area and could not transmit radio reports without surfacing. The psychological impact was enormous. For the first two years of the war, Japanese submarine commanders had operated with confidence.
They knew American anti-ubmarine weapons were not highly effective. Early war reports had shown that American depth charge attacks rarely resulted in kills. A skilled commander could often evade depth charge attacks through aggressive maneuvering. But scouting line NA changed that calculation. Six submarines went out. None came back. Japanese commanders did not know about the hedgehog. They did not understand why American attacks had become so deadly. They only knew that submarines were dying at unprecedented rates and there was no way to counter it.
Without understanding the specific threat, they could not develop effective counter measures. By late summer 1944, Japanese submarine effectiveness in the region had dropped significantly. They were present but not effective. American convoys sailed with minimal losses. American fleet movements went largely undetected. The strategic reconnaissance mission that Japanese submarines were supposed to perform was compromised. The destruction of scouting line NA contributed to Japanese failures at the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944. American carriers operated with greater freedom because Japanese submarines were no longer providing effective reconnaissance.
The Japanese fleet sailed to meet the American carriers without accurate intelligence on American force composition or positions. This intelligence failure contributed to the catastrophic Japanese defeat in what became known as the Great Mariana’s Turkey Shoot. The transformation of American anti-ubmarine warfare came down to technology and training. The Hedgehog gave American ships a weapon that could hit submarines during the critical approach phase. The forward firing ark eliminated the blind spot that had allowed submarines to evade depth charge attacks.
The contact fuses provided immediate feedback. Explosions meant hits. Silence meant misses. The weapon worked. But technology alone did not explain USS England’s success. Many ships had hedgehog launchers. Only USS England sank six submarines in 12 days. The difference was training and crew quality. Lieutenant Williamson’s intensive training regimen had prepared England’s crew for exactly the kind of operations they faced in May 1944. The months of repetitive drills had created muscle memory and instinctive responses. When combat came, the crew executed without hesitation.
The sonar operators could track submarines through aggressive evasive maneuvers. They could distinguish between real contacts and false echoes. They could maintain contact through difficult water conditions. The hedgehog crews could reload and prepare for firing in under 3 minutes. The engineering crew could execute precise speed changes necessary for accurate firing solutions. The damage control parties could handle casualties and keep the ship fighting. Every man on the ship knew his job and trusted his shipmates. That combination of technology and crew quality proved unbeatable.
After her 12-day patrol in May 1944, USS England continued operations in the Pacific through the summer and fall. She escorted convoys, conducted anti-ubmarine patrols, and participated in amphibious operations, including landings in the Philippines. She never again achieved the concentration of kills she had accomplished in May, but remained an effective anti-ubmarine platform. Japanese submarines became increasingly scarce in her operating areas, partly because of the losses inflicted in May. On May 9th, 1945, while operating off Okinawa, USS England was attacked by three Japanese dive bombers.
The ship shot down one bomber with anti-aircraft fire, but the damaged aircraft crashed into England’s superructure in a kamicazi attack. The crash killed 37 crew members and wounded 25 others. The impact destroyed the bridge and damaged the forward superructure. Fire spread through three compartments. For several minutes, the ship’s survival was in doubt. The damage was severe. The superructure was wrecked, but the crew controlled the damage and saved the ship. Damage control parties fought the fires. Engineers kept the engines running.
Medical personnel treated the wounded. The ship survived because the crew refused to give up. USS England steamed to Kuramaretto for emergency repairs, then returned to the United States under her own power. The fact that she could make the transit across the Pacific after suffering such severe damage testified to both her structural integrity and the skill of her crew. She arrived at Philadelphia Navy Yard on July 16th, 1945 for conversion to a high-speed transport. The conversion was cancelled when Japan surrendered on August 15th.
USS England was decommissioned on October 15th, 1945. She had been in service for 1 year and 10 months. During that time, she earned 10 battle stars and the presidential unit citation. She was stricken from the Naval Register on November 1st, 1945 and sold for scrap on November 26th, 1946. The ship was not preserved. In the immediate postwar period, the Navy had hundreds of surplus destroyer escorts. Preservation resources were limited and prioritized for larger, more historically significant vessels.
USS England was just one more ship to be disposed of. No museum claimed her. No memorial preserved her. She was cut up for scrap metal like hundreds of other wartime vessels. This remains a source of regret among naval historians who recognize the ship’s unique accomplishments. Lieutenant Commander Walton Pendleton remained in the Navy after the war and retired as a captain in January 1947. He died on December 9th, 1972 and was buried in Arlington National Cemetery. Throughout his postwar career, he rarely spoke about USS England or the 12-day patrol.
When asked, he always credited his executive officer and crew. He never claimed personal credit for the achievements. Lieutenant John Williamson succeeded Pendleton as commanding officer of USS England in September 1944. He commanded the ship through the remainder of the war, including the Kamicazi attack in May 1945. He remained in the Navy after the war and retired as a captain in 1968. He wrote extensively about anti-ubmarine warfare and training methods. His article in Proceedings magazine in March 1980 co-authored with William Dana remains the definitive account of the 12-day patrol and provides detailed tactical analysis of each attack.
The story of USS England demonstrates how success in warfare comes from the combination of good technology, intensive training, and skilled execution under pressure. No single factor explains the achievement. The hedgehog provided the technological advantage. Williamson’s training created the crew proficiency. The intelligence from Fleet Radio Unit Pacific provided the targeting information. All three elements were necessary. The Hedgehog was available to many ships. USS England used it better than anyone else. The technology mattered, but the people mattered more.
Lieutenant Williamson understood that. He spent months training his crew to a level of proficiency that other ships never achieved. When combat came, that training proved decisive. The crew executed complex operations under stress without hesitation because they had practiced those operations hundreds of times during aring the training. The sonar operators held contact through aggressive evasive maneuvers. The weapons crews reloaded and fired with precision. The engineering crews executed the precise speed changes necessary for accurate attacks. The bridge team coordinated all these elements seamlessly.
Every component worked together seamlessly. That was not luck. That was training. The destruction of scouting line NA in May 1944 contributed to larger Allied success in the Pacific. Japanese submarine reconnaissance became ineffective. American fleet operations enjoyed greater freedom of movement. Convoy losses decreased. The strategic initiative shifted further toward the Allies. The Battle of the Philippine Sea became an overwhelming American victory, partly because Japanese submarines failed to provide adequate warning. American carriers approached the Maranas without being detected.
The resulting battle destroyed Japanese naval aviation as an effective fighting force. All of that traced back to 12 days in May when USS England systematically destroyed six submarines and broke Japanese confidence in their underwater forces. The men who accomplished it never claimed to be heroes. They claimed only to have done their jobs. They trained hard. They executed their mission. They supported each other under fire. But doing your job when it matters most is exactly what heroism looks like in war.